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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over the cost to repair property damage to a

motorhome. The motorhome's owners, Joel and Kathleen Harmon ("Harmons"), appeal from a
grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
("State Farm Mutual") dismissing the breach of contract and bad faith Complaint.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
State Farm Mutual adds the following to the Harmons' sparse Course of Proceedings:
Harmons filed a Verified Complaint on June 17, 2014. (R., p. 12 of 50.) On July 21,

2014, State Farm Mutual filed its Answer and moved to stay the proceedings and to compel
appraisal. (R., p. 16 of 50; Supplemental Clerk's Record ("SR"), p. 60 of 315.) On August 22,
2014, the parties stipulated to stay the proceedings pending completion of appraisal and an Order
Granting Stay of Proceedings Pending Completion of Appraisal was filed on August 29, 2014.
(SR, p. 123 of 315; 125 of 315.) The appraisal process was completed on January 30, 2015,
when the Umpire issued the binding appraisal decision determining the amount of the cost to
repair all property damage to the motorhome (amount ofloss). (SR, p. 221 of 315.) Harmons
stipulated to lift the stay of proceedings. (Augmented Record dated June 17, 2016, p. 3.)
Harmons did not seek to vacate, modify or otherwise correct the appraisal decision. Harmons
did not appeal the appraisal decision.
State Farm Mutual filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 26, 2015, along with a
Concise Statement of Undisputed Facts, Supporting Memorandum, Affidavit of Dennis
1

Schwatka and Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Thomson. (SR, pp. 200-308 of315.) Harmons responded.
(Second Supplemental Clerk's Record ("Second SR"), pp. 31-46 of7I.) By Memorandum
Decision and Order filed August 18, 2015, the district court granted State Farm Mutual's Motion
for Summary Judgment dismissing the Complaint in its entirety. (R., p. 28 of 50.) Final
Judgment was entered on August 24, 2015. (R., p. 44 of 50.)
On September 8, 2015, Harmons filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 59. (Second SR, p. 58 of71.) The Order
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was filed October 26, 2015.
(Augmented Record dated June 17, 2016, p. 5.)
Harmons' timely filed their Notice of Appeal on November 24, 2015. (R., p. 46.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

State Farm Mutual disagrees with Harmons' characterization of many facts and provides
the following additional Statement of Facts:
1.

Property Damage.

Harmons owned a 2008 National Pacifica 40D Motorhome. (R., p. 13 of 50, , 4.) On
December 19, 2013, the motorhome was damaged, including damage to the dash. (R., p. 13 of
50,, 5; SR p. 63 of 315.) The damage occurred while the motorhome was stored for the winter
at RVs Northwest in Spokane, Washington. (SR, p. 63 of315.)
2.

Insurance Policy.

The motorhome was insured under Policy No. 070 6287-Bl5-02, issued by State Farm
Mutual. (SR, p. 70 of315.) The policy is an Alaska Policy. (SR, p. 70 of315.) The policy
2

provided comprehensive coverage. (SR, pp. 95-96 of315.) This coverage extended to property
damage to a covered vehicle. Id.
The loss settlement provisions applicable to comprehensive coverage gave State Farm
Mutual the right to choose to settle with the owner of a covered vehicle by either paying the cost
to repair the covered vehicle minus any applicable deductible or paying the actual cash value of
the covered vehicle minus any applicable deductible. (SR, pp. 97-98 of 315; Appendix A.) If
State Farm Mutual chose to pay the cost to repair the covered vehicle it had the right to choose
one of three methods to determine the cost to repair. (Id., at p. 97 of 315.) One available choice
to determine the cost to repair is "[a] bid or repair estimate approved by [State Farm Mutual]."
Id.
If the parties cannot agree on the cost to repair or the actual cash value of the covered

vehicle, those amounts "shall be decided by an appraisal upon written demand by the owner of
the covered vehicle ... or [State Farm Mutual]." (SR, p. 98 of 315.) Both parties demanded
appraisal. (Id. atp. 266 of315; 268 of315.)
Each party selects an appraiser. (SR, p. 98 of 3 15.) If the appraisers agree on the amount
of the cost to repair or the actual cash value, that amount is binding on the parties. (Id.) If the
appraisers cannot agree the binding amount is decided by the Umpire. (Id.)
The policy contains a choice of law provision requiring that Alaska law apply. (SR, pp.
108-109 of 315.) The district court and the parties applied Alaska law but looked to Idaho law
when there was no applicable Alaska law or for additional analysis.

3

3.

Harmons' Property Damage Claim.

State Farm Mutual immediately began investigating Harmons' property damage claim.
(Second SR, p. 23 of 71.) Comprehensive coverage was extended to the loss. (SR, p. 65 of 315.)
The investigation determined that there was damage to the interior of the motorhome, including
to the dash. (Second SR, p. 25 of 71.) State Farm Mutual was informed by an employee of RVs
Northwest (the location where the motorhome was being stored at the time of the loss) that the
dash was not repairable. (Second SR, p. 20 of 71, ,r 7.) State Farm Mutual began looking for a
replacement dash. (SR, p. 65 of315.)
During its search for a replacement dash, State Farm Mutual learned that the company
that built the motorhome had gone out of business. (Second SR, p. 20 of 71, ,r 8.) A
manufacturer was located that could manufacture a mold to make a new dash, but as a condition
to doing so the manufacturer required the purchase of additional dashes at a total estimated cost
of $155,000.00. (Second SR, pp. 20 of 71, ,r 8; p. 25 of71.)
State Farm Mutual obtained bids from several RV repair shops and determined that a
replacement dash had an estimated cost of $2,000.00. (SR, p. 65 of 315.) State Farm Mutual
obtained an estimate from RVs Northwest of the cost to repair all damage which included the
cost of a replacement dash for a total estimate of $18,491.36. (Second SR, p. 25 of 71.) On May
29, 2014, State Farm Mutual offered to pay Harmons the amount of the estimate ($18,491.36).
(SR, p. 65 of315.) Harmons responded to the offer by filing a lawsuit on June 17, 2014. (R., p.
12 of 50.)
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Subsequently, during the appraisal process, a used replacement dash was located. (SR, p.
29 5 of 315.) The used dash was for the previous year's model. (Id.) Although it was not an
exact match, it would fit. (Id) State Farm Mutual also learned that the damaged dash was in
fact repairable. (Id.) State Farm Mutual sent to Harmons estimates for replacing the dash
($18,994.22) and repairing the dash ($18,252.89). (SR, pp. 297-300 of 315.) Both estimates
were subject to a deductible of $500.00. (SR, p. 71 of 315.) State Farm Mutual requested that
Harmons choose between replacing the damaged dash or repairing it. (SR, p. 295 of 315.) On
October 30, 2014, Harmons stated they did not want a used dash (unless it was identical). (SR,
p. 301 of 315.) Harmons stated they would follow up with a repair shop about the feasibility of
repairing the dash. Id. On January 21, 2015, Harmons chose to have the dash repaired.

1

(SR, p.

304 of315.) On February 4, 2015, Harmons accepted the Umpire's determination of the cost to
repair the damage to the motorhome in the amount of $18,252.90, minus the $500.00 deductible.
(SR, p. 307 of315.)

4.

The Appraisal Process.

Harmons' comprehensive coverage required appraisal of the cost to repair or the actual
cash value of the covered vehicle upon written demand by either party if the parties failed to
agree on those amounts. (SR, p. 98 of315; Appendix A.) On September 24, 2014, Harmons

The acceptance was subject to discovering additional damage during the repair process that
might require payment of additional costs to repair, a standard practice and a cost State Farm
Mutual had already agreed to pay as a supplemental payment. (SR, p. 295 of 315.) Acceptance
was also subject to whether the repairs were in accordance with the policy terms. (Id.)
1
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demanded appraisal of the actual cash value. (SR, p. 266 of315.) State Farm Mutual demanded
appraisal of the cost to repair on October 1, 2014. (SR. p. 269 of315.)
The appraisal provision required that each party select a competent appraiser and the two
appraisers select a competent and impartial Umpire. (SR, p. 98 of 315; Appendix A.) Each
appraiser then separately states in writing the amount of loss. Id If the appraisers agree on the
amount, that agreed upon amount is binding. Id If the appraisers do not agree, the
determination of the amount of the loss is submitted to the Umpire who then selects one of the
appraisers' determination as the amount of the loss. Id That amount then becomes binding on
the parties. 2 Id
The appraisers were unable to agree on the amount of the cost to repair and the matter
was submitted to the Umpire. (SR, p. 221 of315.) On January 30, 2015, the Umpire issued his
decision that the cost to repair all damages, including the dash, was $18,252.89. Id That
amount became binding on the parties.
Two months before the Umpire's decision, on November 25, 2014, State Farm Mutual
paid the amount of the Umpire's decision minus the $500.00 deductible. (SR, p. 279-280 of
315.) This was the estimate by the State Farm Mutual appraiser and later chosen by the Umpire
as the amount of the loss. State Farm Mutual paid that amount upon receipt of State Farm
Mutual's appraiser's estimate. (Id)

2 The

appraisal provision provides that certain actions must occur within certain periods. (SR, p.
98 of 315.) Neither party objected when these periods were not met, nor did they object to any
other aspect of the appraisal process.
6

State Farm Mutual's appraiser also submitted an actual cash value estimate to Harmons'
appraiser and the Umpire. (SR, p. 221 of 315.) Harmons' appraiser failed to submit a written
estimate of the actual cash value of the motorhome. (Id) Because the appraisal process relating
to the actual cash value was not completed no appraisal decision was made. State Farm Mutual
moved to lift the stay of proceedings. (Augmented Record dated June 17, 2016, p. 1.) Harmons
stipulated to lift the stay. (Id. at p. 3.) The litigation proceeded. 3 At no time did the Harmons
object to or otherwise challenge the appraisal process or the Umpire's decision on the amount of
the loss.
II. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

State Farm Mutual restates the issues on appeal as follows:
A.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing the breach of
contract cause of action on the ground that State Farm Mutual had no contract
duty to pay to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss condition?

B.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing the bad faith
cause of action on the grounds that: (1) without a breach of contract there can be
no bad faith; (2) State Farm Mutual took an objectively reasonable amount of
time to determine the cost to repair in accordance with the policy provisions; and
(3) the amount ofloss was fairly debatable?

State Farm Mutual offers the following additional issue on appeal:
A.

Did the contractual, binding appraisal process and outcome resolve the breach of
contract and bad faith causes of action?

3 There was no written order lifting the stay but all parties and the court proceeded with the
litigation.
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.
It appears that Idaho appellate standards of review apply even when a choice of law

provision requires application of the law of another state. See Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148
Idaho 261,264,220 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2009) (applying Idaho standard ofreview when Delaware
choice of law was at issue). Consequently, the Idaho standard of review is set forth below.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard ofreview is the same as
the district court's standard in ruling upon a motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 475476, 58 P.3d 488, 490-491 (2002). Thus, this Court will review the record before the district
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de
nova whether, after construing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there

exists any genuine issue of material fact and whether the successful movant below is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Tusch Enterprise v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026
(1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c). Alaska's standard ofreview of a grant of summary judgment appears to
be consistent with Idaho's. Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd, 43 P.3d 432, 447-48
(Alaska 2002).
B.

Analysis.
1.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Dismissed the Breach of Contract
Cause of Action.

Harmons' breach of contract cause of action is essentially based on a single proposition that State Farm Mutual is obligated, but refused to pay the cost to repair the property damage to
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the motorhome to its pre-loss condition. The district court correctly determined that State Farm
Mutual had no such obligation.
Harmons agree, and the insurance contract provides, that State Farm Mutual has the right
to choose from several methods to determine the cost to repair the property damage.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 5; SR, p. 97 of 315; Appendix A.) Here, State Farm Mutual chose to
determine the cost to repair based on "[a] bid or estimate approved by [State Farm Mutual]."
(SR, p. 65 of 315.) Harmons argue, however, that the policy language and their reasonable
expectations require the cost to repair to include the cost to restore the damage to its pre-loss
condition. Specifically, they argue that "pre-loss condition" language attaches to the method
chosen by State Farm Mutual and that their reasonable expectations were the damage would be
restored to its pre-loss condition. At no time at the district court level did Harmons establish
what restoring the motorhome damage to its pre-loss condition meant or how any estimate of the
cost to repair did not include doing so.
Harmons rewrite the contract in order to attach the pre-loss condition to State Farm
Mutual's chosen method for determining the cost to repair. This they cannot do.
Harmons' expectations are neither reasonable nor supported. Under the Alaska
reasonable expectations doctrine Harmons cannot add words or reposition contract language to
support their expectations. Nothing in the insurance policy as written supports a reasonable
expectation that the cost to repair included the cost to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss
condition.
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Nor did Harmons meet their burden of establishing an objectively reasonable expectation.
No where have they defined or described or established what they reasonably expected pre-loss
condition to be. Without proof of that expectation, reasonable or otherwise, there can be no error
in dismissing the breach of contract cause of action alleging that State Farm Mutual failed to pay
to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss condition. There is no evidence that State Farm
Mutual's approved estimate did not include the cost to repair the motorhome to Harmons'
reasonable expectations. Indeed, case law and the contract language show that pre-loss condition
does not mean the exact condition as before the damage.
Finally, the appraisal process determined, independently, the binding amount of the cost
to repair in an amount less than State Farm Mutual's determination under its chosen method.
Harmons did not challenge the appraisal determination and accepted it as the cost to repair
without regard to whether that binding amount would restore the motorhome to its pre-loss
condition. For the reasons discussed in more detail below, the district court's grant of summary
judgment should be affirmed.
a.

The District Court Correctly Ruled that State Farm Mutual Had No
Contract Obligation to Pay to Restore the Motorhome to its Pre-Loss
Condition.
(1)

The Unambiguous Language of the Policy Allows State Farm
Mutual to Settle Harmons' Property Damage Claim by Paying the
Cost to Repair Based on an Estimate Approved by It.

The applicable and unambiguous policy language allows State Farm Mutual to choose the
method for determining the cost to repair the Harmons' motorhome. (SR, p. 98 of 315.) The
Harmons agree. (Appellants' Brief, p. 5.) One method is based on "[a] bid or repair estimate
10

approved by [State Farm Mutual]." (Id) This was the method chosen by State Farm Mutual.
(SR, p. 65 of315.)
There were two separate estimates set forth in the estimate from RVs Northwest: (1) an
estimate to repair the damage to the motorhome, including the estimated cost to replace the dash,
in the amount of $18,491.36; and (2) an estimate based on a quote from a manufacturer that
could fabricate a mold and make a new dash, in the amount of $184, 189.39. (Second SR, pp.
24-25 of 71.) This latter estimate required State Farm Mutual to pay the cost to manufacture the
mold and purchase numerous additional dashes. (Id) State Farm Mutual approved the estimate
in the amount of$18,491.36. (SR, p. 65 of315.) State Farm Mutual did not approve the
estimate in the amount of $184,189.39.
Harmons argue the written and approved estimate of the cost to repair does not comply
with the policy because: (1) it included an estimated amount to replace a dash not yet found; and
(2) it is not the estimate of the "actual" cost to repair because it did not include the cost to repair
the dash to its pre-loss condition.
(2)

An Approved Repair Estimate that Includes the Cost to Replace a
Not Yet Found Dash Does Not Breach the Contract.

When State Farm Mutual chooses, as the method to determine the cost to repair, an
estimate it approves, State Farm Mutual's only contract obligation is to lli!Y the amount of the
estimate. State Farm Mutual does not select or approve the repair shop. Harmons do. State
Farm Mutual does not make the repairs, nor is it obligated to find a replacement part. These
obligations belong to the repair shop selected and approved by the Harmons. State Farm

11

Mutual's obligation is to pay the estimated cost ofrepair, including paying the cost to replace the
irreparable parts.
During State Farm Mutual's initial investigation it was told (wrongly) that the dash was
irreparable. Although not obligated to do so, State Farm Mutual searched for a replacement
dash. (SR, p. 65 of 315.) When it was unsuccessful, State Farm Mutual investigated and
determined that the cost to replace the dash was in the $2,000.00 range. (Id.) This amount was
added to the estimate. (Id.) Subsequent to the approval of the estimate, the Harmons selected a
repair shop. (SR, p. 306 of 315.) The repair shop is tasked and paid to make the repairs and if
replacement parts are needed, to locate the parts.
A replacement dash was located. (Id. at 295 of315.) It was offered to the Harmons.
(Id.) They rejected it in favor ofrepairing the original dash. (Id. at 301 of315.) State Farm

Mutual paid the amount of the cost to repair. (Id. at 279 of315.) This is all the contract
required. State Farm Mutual did not breach the contract by approving and offering to pay an
estimate that included the estimated cost to replace a dash it did not find, especially when the
repair shop found one and Harmons rejected it.
(3)

The Clear and Unambiguous Contract Language Does Not Require
State Farm Mutual to Pay the Cost to Restore the Property Damage
to Pre-Loss Condition.

Harmons argue that the "restore the covered vehicle to its pre-loss condition" language
in the policy modifies all methods available to determine the cost to repair, including the method
chosen by State Farm Mutual. In order to attach the "restore ... to pre-loss condition" language
to State Farm Mutual's chosen method Harmons must rewrite the insurance contract. The
12

contract cannot be rewritten in order to support a breach of that contract. Allstate Ins. Co. v.

Teel, 100 P.3d 2, 4 (Alaska 2004).
The three methods by which State Farm Mutual determines the cost to repair are set forth
in the policy as follows: Method l.a.(l)(a)- by agreement of the parties; Method l.a.(l)(b)

a

repair estimate approved by State Farm Mutual; and Method l.a.(l)(c)- a repair estimate based
upon or adjusted to the prevailing competitive price. (Appendix A.) State Farm Mutual chose
Method 1.a.(l )(b) - a repair estimate approved by it. Harmons argue that this method is subject
to the language that "[t]he estimate will include parts sufficient to restore the covered vehicle to
its pre-loss condition." Harmons are mistaken.

13

The "restore the covered vehicle to its pre-loss condition" language applies only to
method l.a.(l)(c), a method not chosen by State Farm Mutual. The applicable policy language
states as follows:

I.

We have the right to choose to settle with you or the ovvner
of the covered vehicle in one of the following ways:
a.
Pay the cost to repair the covered vehicle minus any
applicable deductible.
(1)
We have the right to choose one of the
following to determine the cost to repair the
covered vehicle.
(a)
The cost agreed to by both the owner
of the covered vehicle and us;
(b)
A bid or repair estimate approved by
us; or
(c)
A repair estimate that is written
based upon or adjusted to:
(i)
the prevailing competitive
pnce;
(ii)
the paintless dent repair price
that is competitive in the
market; or
(iii)
a combination of (i) and (ii)
above.
The prevailing competitive price
means prices charged by a majority
of the repair market in the area
where the covered vehicle is to be
repaired as determined by a survey
made by us. If asked, we will
identify some facilities that will
perform the repairs at the prevailing
competitive price. The estimate will
include parts sufficient to restore the
covered vehicle to its pre-loss
condition.

14

(SR, p. 97 of 315; Appendix A.)
The pre-loss condition language is found in a paragraph immediately following Method
l.a.(l)(c). (Id.) The indentation of the pre-loss condition paragraph places it on the same
vertical plane as Method l.a.(l)(c) thereby qualifying and defining that method. (Id.) If the
drafters of the insurance policy had intended that paragraph to apply to Methods l.a.(l)(a) and
l .a.(1 )(b), the pre-loss condition paragraph would have been moved to the left, and placed on the
same vertical plane as l .a.(1 ). The pre-loss condition paragraph does not apply to or qualify
Method l .a.(1 )(b ), the method chosen by State Farm Mutual.
Further evidence that the pre-loss condition paragraph applies only to Method l .a.(1 )( c)
is found in the term "prevailing competitive price". This term is only found in the language
qualifying Method l .a.(1 )( c). (Appendix A - l .a.(1 )(c)(iii).) That term is defined in the same
paragraph in which the pre-loss condition language is found. This further establishes that any
requirement that the vehicle be restored to its pre-loss condition applies only to Method 1.a.(l)(c)
and not to State Farm Mutual's chosen method.
Harmons' argument that the cost to repair, regardless of the method used, must include
the cost to restore their motorhome to its pre-loss condition requires a rewriting and restructuring
of the policy language. As a matter of contract construction there was no obligation that State
Farm Mutual pay the cost to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss condition.

15

(4)

Harmons' Expectations Do Not Create a Contract Obligation to
Pay to Restore the Motorhome to its Pre-Loss Condition.

Regardless of the contract language, Harmons claim that their reasonable expectation was
that the cost to repair included restoring their motorhome to its pre-loss condition. (Appellants'
Brief, p. 6.) Alaska has adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations when reviewing the
terms of an insurance policy. Allstate Ins. Co., 100 P.3d at 4. 4 The doctrine applies, however,
only to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured. Id. at 6. Alaska courts will not,
however, ignore or rewrite provisions in an insurance contract in order to meet those
expectations. Id.
Fatal to Harmons' reasonable expectations is their failure to establish, or even define or
describe, what restoring their motorhome to its pre-loss condition means. Without defining "preloss condition" there can be no breach of contract for failing to pay to restore the motorhome to
that condition. There can be no genuine issue of material fact that State Farm Mutual breached
the contract by failing to meet an undefined standard or expectation.
To the extent Harmons argue in reply that restoring their motorhome to its pre-loss
condition means restoring it to factory or mint condition or to its identical condition before the
property was damaged, this is not a reasonable expectation, nor is it supported by the objective
and common meaning of the term "repair". Harmons point to selective definitions of the word
"repair" to establish that their expectations are objectively reasonable. For instance, Harrnons
cite to the Alaska Supreme Court's reference to Webster's Dictionary's definition of the word
Idaho has rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho,
138 Idaho 443, 449, 65 P.3d 184, 190 (2002).

4
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"repair." (Appellants' Brief, p. 6, citing to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 160 P.3d 134, 139
(Alaska 2007).) Repair is defined as: "to restore by replacing a part or putting together what is
torn or broken." Id That definition does not, however, define repair as restoring property to its
pre-loss condition. It does not say that the repaired damage must be to new or mint condition. It
does not define "pre-loss condition." In fact, "putting togeth~r what is torn or broken" implies it
will not be exactly as it was before it was damaged. This definition does not establish a
reasonable expectation that "repair" means to restore the property to some undefined pre-loss
condition.
Harmons also quote a dissenting opinion in a Washington decision setting forth the same
definition ofrepair as the Alaska Supreme Court. (Appellants' Brief, p. 7, citing Moeller v.

Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 267 P.3d 998, 1007 (Wash. 2011).) As indicated above, this
definition does not establish a reasonable expectation that State Farm Mutual must pay to restore
the motorhome to its pre-loss condition.
What Harmons fail to quote or otherwise mention is the next paragraph in the
Washington decision stating that:
In accordance with this definition, Farmers "repairs" a damaged
vehicle when it returns the vehicle to substantially the same
physical condition that it was in prior to the accident by fixing and
replacing damaged parts. See O'Brien v. Progressive N Ins. Co.,
785 A2d 821,287 (DL. Super. Ct. 2001). "This definition of
repair does not require the insurer to restore the vehicle to factory
condition or even to the condition of the vehicle before the
accident." Id at 290. Nor does it require the insurer to restore the
vehicle to its pre-accident market value. Culhane [v. W National
Mutual Ins. Co., 704 N.W.2d 287,295 (SD 2005)].
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Moeller, 267 P.3d at 107 (dissenting opinion). The Washington dissenting opinion cites to
0 'Brien v. Progressive. In that case, the Delaware appellate court, in its majority opinion,
agreed with this amplified definition of repair:
Under the 'repair or replace' limitations in the policy, the insurer's
liability to a claimant is 'capped at the cost of returning the
damaged vehicle to substantially the same physical, operating, and
mechanical condition as existed before the loss. This obligation
includes neither diminution in value resulting from a "market
psychology" nor that resulting from the minute physical
imperfections that are inherent to any repair, so long as repairs
have been completed in a workmanlike manner and the vehicle has
been returned to substantially the same form as before the accident.
0 'Brien, 785 A.2d at 290.
Harmons' search for an objectively reasonable meaning of the word "repair" to support
their expectations is not supported by the dictionary definition or case law on which they rely. In
fact, a more robust analysis supports a definition of "repair" that does not require that their
motorhome be restored to factory condition, or even to its condition before the accident.

Moeller, 267 P.3d at 107 (dissenting opinion); O'Brien, 785 A.2d at 290. A reasonable
expectation of the meaning ofrepair recognizes the imperfections inherent in any repair. Under
a reasonably objective and common meaning of the word "repair", State Farm Mutual is only
obligated to pay the cost to repair the motorhome in a workmanlike manner and to return it to
substantially the same pre-loss physical condition. Id.
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(5)

Harmons Failed to Meet Their Burden that State Farm Mutual' s
Cost to Repair Did Not Include the Cost to Restore the Motorhome
to its Pre-Loss Condition.

To the extent that the insurance contract is interpreted to require that the cost ofrepair
includes payment to restore the vehicle to its pre-loss condition, there is no evidence that the
estimate approved by State Farm Mutual did not include that cost. The common definition of
repair does not require restoring the vehicle to factory or mint condition or even to the condition
of the vehicle before the accident. The cost to repair need only include repairs completed in a
workmanlike manner that returns the physical condition of the vehicle to substantially the same
form as before the accident.
To the extent that Harmons rely on their expectation that the motorhome would be
restored to its pre-loss condition, they have failed to describe what that term means to them.
Without establishing what their reasonable expectation is, they cannot establish that State Farm
Mutual breached the contract based on that undefined expectation on appeal. This Court should
not be forced to speculate about the standard upon which the breach is based. Nevertheless, to
the extent their reasonable expectation was that the cost to repair must include the cost to restore
the motorhome to its identical pre-loss condition, that expectation is neither reasonable nor
supported by the common meaning of"repair". To the extent the Harmons' reasonable
expectation was consistent with the common meaning of repair, there is no evidence that the
estimate approved by State Farm Mutual did not include the cost to complete repairs in a
workmanlike manner and restore the physical condition of the vehicle to substantially the same
form as before the accident.
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State Farm Mutual did not breach the insurance contract based on any alleged failure to
pay the cost to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss condition.
b.

When the Parties Could Not Agree, Binding Appraisal Determined the
Cost to Repair; State Farm Mutual Timely Pre-Paid that Amount.

Under Alaska law an appraisal provision is required in all Alaska insurance policies
providing first-party property, casualty, or inland marine coverage. See AS § 21.96.035. The
Alaska statute was specifically enacted to avoid the expense of litigating the cost of repair of
damaged property covered by insurance, McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 P.3d
715, 723 n. 32 (Alaska 2013) ("AS 21.96.035 is initially described in the Bill Summary to House
Bill (H.B.) 425 as '[a] new section requir[ing] that all automobile, homeowner, or dwelling
policies include an appraisal clause to resolve a dispute between the insured and the insurer over
the value of first party property loss. . . Without an appraisal clause, such disputes may have
required costly litigation."') The appraisal provision in the Harmons' policy incorporates the
appraisal procedure described in AS§ 21.96.035. (Compare SR, p. 98 of315 top. 54 of315.)
Appraisal is the ultimate method for determining the cost of repair. It is unrelated to
agreements of the parties, approved estimates, pre-loss condition or reasonable expectations. If
the parties are unable to agree on the cost to repair, the cost to repair is decided by binding
appraisal. There is no requirement that the appraisers or the umpire accept or adopt an estimate
approved by State Farm Mutual. 5 There is no requirement that any method to determine the csot

In fact, none did. State Farm Mutual's approved estimate was in the amount of $18,491.36.
(SR, p. 65 of315.) The appraisal award was in the lesser amount of$18,252.86. (SR, p. 275 of
315.)
5
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to repair be used in the appraisal process. There is no "pre-loss condition" language in the
appraisal provision. The appraisers conduct an independent appraisal and "separately state in
writing the amount of the loss." (SR, p. 98 of315.) If the appraisers agree on the amount of the
loss, that amount is binding on the parties. (Id.) If the appraisers cannot agree, the Umpire
chooses the amount of loss determined by one of the appraisers and that amount is binding. (Id.)
There cannot be any expectation, reasonable or otherwise, that the cost to repair determined by
the appraisal process is anything other than the actual amount of their loss. That amount is
binding on the parties regardless of whether it includes the cost to repair the motorhome to its
pre-loss condition. That amount is binding on the parties regardless of whether either party
expected a different amount. That amount is binding on the parties regardless of prior estimates.
Upon conclusion of the appraisal process there was an indisputable cost to repair. It is against
that amount that any breach must be measured. State Farm Mutual pre-paid that amount.
This Court, faced with a similar situation, upheld the dismissal on summary judgment of
a breach of contract cause of action when the parties followed the contractual appraisal process.

See Daves, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 153 Idaho 744,291 P.3d 427 (2012). This
Court ruled that the insurance contract specified appraisal as the process for resolving a dispute
between the parties over the amount of loss, the parties followed that appraisal process and State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company timely paid the amount determined by that process. Id., 153
Idaho at 750-753; 291 P.3d at 433-436. Based on the same analysis, the dismissal of the breach
of contract cause of action on summary judgment should be affirmed.
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Harmons' insurance contract sets forth the process for resolving any dispute over the
amount of loss - through appraisal. The appraisal process was completed. No party challenged
the appraisal determination of the cost to repair. This binding and unchallenged cost to repair
laid to rest all disagreements of the parties. State Farm Mutual pre-paid the amount of the loss
determined by appraisal. With the completion of the appraisal process and payment of the
amount ofloss, the contract requirements were met. The district court's dismissal of the breach
of contract cause of action should be affirmed.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err When it Dismissed the Bad Faith Cause of
Action.

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing bad faith on the following
grounds: (1) because there was no breach of contract; there cannot be bad faith; (2) State Farm
Mutual had a reasonable basis for any alleged delay in payment of the claim; and (3) the amount
of loss was fairly debatable. (R, pp. 31-42 of 50.) The dismissal of the bad faith claim can be
affirmed on any one or all of these grounds.
The Harmons argue: (1) dismissal of bad faith was in error because State Farm Mutual
did breach the insurance contract; (2) it is a question of fact whether State Farm Mutual's
conduct was reasonable when it failed to pay a cost ofrepair in the amount of $184,189.34 or an
actual cash value of $150,000.00 to $170,000.00, and instead offered to pay an amount that did
not include the cost to restore the motorhome to its pre-loss condition; and (3) although the
amount of the cost to repair may be fairly debatable, the requirement that State Farm Mutual pay
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either the actual cost to repair ($184,139.34) or the actual cash value ($150,000.00-$170,000.00)
was not fairly debatable.
To prove bad faith in Alaska, a plaintiff must establish "the absence of a reasonable basis
for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the
lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." Hillman v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 855
P.2d 1321, 1324 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,
376-77 (Wis. 1978).). In adopting the tort of bad faith in first-party cases Alaska has aligned
itself with those jurisdictions that have followed Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P .2d 1032
(Cal. 1973). See Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1323. 6
Alaska has quoted with approval the "Anderson standard" that "an insurance company
may still challenge claims which are fairly debatable." Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1324 (quoting
Noble v. National American Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981), analyzing the bad

faith analysis in Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).).
Alaska has also quoted favorably from Anderson that the reasonableness of an insurance
company's actions is based on an objective standard.
The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would,
on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reasonable
insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed payment of
the claim under the facts and circumstances.

Idaho is a jurisdiction that has followed Gruenberg. See White v. Unigard Mutual Ins. Co., 112
Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (1986). The Alaska Supreme Court has looked to and quoted
Idaho bad faith law. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156
(Alaska 1989).
6
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Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1324 (quoting Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376-77).
Harmons argue that the district court erroneously dismissed their bad faith cause of action
because State Farm Mutual's reasonableness is a question of fact for the jury. Under the

Anderson objective standard, Alaska rejected as without merit Harmons' argument that
reasonableness always presents a question of fact. Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1325. Summary
judgment is appropriate in dismissing bad faith "[i]f, when viewing the evidence most favorably
to the opponent of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court finds that a reasonable jury
could only conclude that the challenged conduct must be characterized in one way, then
summary judgment in accordance with that conclusion should be entered." Hillman, 855 P.2d at
1325.
a.

The District Court Properly Dismissed the Bad Faith Cause of Action
Because there was No Breach of Contract.

The district court dismissed the bad faith cause of action because there was no breach of
contract. (R, pp. 31-34 of 50.) State Farm Mutual was unable to find an Alaska case specifically
holding that if there is no breach of the insurance contract, there cannot be bad faith, as a matter
of law. On the other hand, State Farm Mutual found no Alaska case establishing an independent
cause of action for bad faith without regard to whether the insurance contract has been breached.
Alaska law does establish that, for insurance contracts, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by the insurer is what gives the insured a cause of action for bad faith. Lockwood v.

Geico General Ins. Co., 323 P.3d 691, 697 (Alaska 2014). Implied in this foundation to Alaska
bad faith law is that there must be a breach of the contract, before there can be a bad faith cause
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of action. Harmons agree their "bad faith cause of action cannot survive if the Harmons can
show no breach of the insurance contract. ... " (Appellants' Brief, p. 11.) This is also
consistent with Idaho law, a jurisdiction to which Alaska looks when it has no cases on point.

See Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 178 45 P.3d 829, 835 (2002).
As described above, State Farm Mutual did not breach the insurance contract. The
district court properly dismissed this cause of action on the grounds that because there was no
breach of contract there could be no bad faith, as a matter of law.
b.

The District Court Properly Determined there was No Bad Faith for any
Alleged Delay in Payment of the Property Damage Claim.

Harmons had the burden of showing that State Farm Mutual had no reasonable basis for
the timing of payment of the amount of loss for the property damage. There is no contract
provision requiring payment within a specific period. In the absence of a contract provision
specifying the time for performance, the law will imply that it be performed within a reasonable
time. Hall v. Add-Ventures Ltd, 695 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Alaska 1985).
There was a disagreement between the parties regarding the amount of the loss. State
Farm Mutual did not agree to the amounts ofloss Harmons claimed was owed in January 2014
(between $150,000.00 and $184,139.34). Harmons did not agree to the amount ofloss offered
by State Farm Mutual on May 29, 2014 ($18,491.36). The contract required that if the parties
cannot agree on the amount of loss that it be resolved through the appraisal process. The
contract thereby established that, when there is a disagreement as to the amount of the loss,
payment is not due until the conclusion of the appraisal process. State Farm Mutual pre-paid the
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amount of the appraisal award on November 21, 2014, two months before the appraisal process
was concluded. State Farm Mutual relied on the insurance contract appraisal provisions for the
timing of payment. No reasonable jury could find that State Farm Mutual' s conduct relating to
when it paid the amount of loss was unreasonable.
Harmons argue that State Farm Mutual was required to offer to pay the amount of loss in
mid-January 2014 based on the information it had "at that point." Harmons claim the
information State Farm Mutual had "at that point" was a cost to repair the motorhome of
approximately $184,000.00 and an actual cash value of the motorhome of between $150,000.00
and $170,000.00. Based on that information, State Farm Mutual was required to offer to pay
either that cost to repair or that actual cash value.
As oflate January 2014, State Farm had sufficient information to
determine that it had to either write a big check for repairs or a big
check for actual cash value.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 12.) Failing to write one of these "big checks in mid or late January 2014",
according to Harmons, was bad faith.
There are two points fatal to Harmons' arguments: (1) "at that point" State Farm Mutual
had additional information upon which to base its offer to pay; and (2) the "big checks" that
should have been written "at that point" would have resulted in an over-payment of hundreds of
thousands of dollars. "At that point" (January 2014) there was a document entitled "estimate"
from RVs Northwest, Inc. within which there were two estimates: an estimate of the cost to
repair the motorhome in the amount of $184,189.38 and an estimate in the amount of
$18,491.36. (Second SR, p. 24 of71.) "At that point" (mid-January 2014), State Farm Mutual
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had two estimates, one in an amount far less than Harmons claim State Farm Mutual was
obligated to pay.
State Farm Mutual has the choice to pay the cost to repair the motorhome or the actual
cash value of the motorhome, whichever is less. (SR, pp. 97-98 of315.) "At that point" in midJanuary 2014, State Farm Mutual had an estimate to repair in the amount of $184,189.34, an
estimate to repair in the amount of $18,491.36 and an actual cash value of between $150,000.00
and $170,000.00. State Farm Mutual approved the estimate in the amount of $18,491.36. There
was no obligation to pay either of the other amounts in mid-January 2014 because "at that point"
State Farm Mutual had information to support a different amount.
Equally fatal is Harmons' claim that State Farm Mutual was in bad faith because it failed
to to pay to them a windfall - when it failed to either write a "big check" in the amount of
$184,189.34 to repair their motorhome or a "big check" in the amount of at least $150,000.00 for
the actual cash value of their motorhome. The appraisal process determined the amount of loss
to be $18,252.89. This was the only amount to which Harmons were ever entitled. Had State
Farm Mutual written a "big check" in mid-January 2014 for either $184,189.34 or $150,000.00 it
would have resulted in an overpayment to Harmons of between $131,747.11 and $166,747.11.
Failing to pay an amount to which Harmons were never owed cannot be the basis for bad faith.
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C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed the Bad Faith Cause of Action on
the Grounds that the Amount of Loss was Fairly Debatable.

The very concept of "reasonableness" suggests that it is reasonable for an insurer to
challenge a fairly debatable claim. The Alaska Supreme Court favorably quotes case law from
other jurisdictions to that effect. See Hillman, 855 P.2d at 1324.
The parties failed to agree on the amount of the loss. Harmons claimed that the cost of
repair was approximately $184,000.00. State Farm Mutual approved an estimate of the cost to
repair in the amount of $18,491.36. The appraisal process determined the amount ofloss to be
$18,252.86. See Welford at 1268 (the reasonableness of an insurer's actions can be measured by
an arbitrator's award). Harmons concede that the amount ofloss could be fairly debatable.
The amount due for repair or actual cash value could have been
fairly debatable; however, the fact that the policy required State
Farm to pay either the actual cost to repair or the actual cash value
is not debatable whatsoever.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 11.) The amount of the cost to repair was fairly debatable.
Because the claim was, at a minimum, fairly debatable, State Farm Mutual had the right
to challenge it. It did so by requesting appraisal. Any alleged delay based on challenging this
fairly debatable claim through a contractually allowed process cannot support bad faith.
The district court properly dismissed the bad faith cause of action.

3.

Harmons are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Harmons are required, in their opening brief, to set forth the basis for a claim for attorney
fees on appeal. (I.A.R., Rule 35(a)(5).) In addition, Harmons are required to support the request
with citations to authorities and statutes. (1.A.R., Rule 35(a)(5).) Harmons seek attorney fees on
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appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9. Harmons have an Alaska policy. Under that policy,
Alaska substantive law applies. Whether attorney fees are available is an issue to be decided
under Alaska law. See Houston v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 911-12, 216 P.3d 1272, 1283-84
(2009). Harmons must support their request with the proper authorities and statutes. Harmons'
only authority/statute cited was Idaho Code § 41-183 9. This statute does not apply and therefore
cannot support their request for fees because the attorney fee law of Alaska applies. Harmons
have failed to cite to any Alaska law entitling them to fees. Harmons' request for attorney fees
on appeal should be denied.
Even ifldaho Code§ 41-1839 applies, Harmons are not entitled to an award on appeal.
As a prerequisite, they must prevail on appeal. Even if they do, they have not yet established an
amount of loss owed and unpaid by State Farm Mutual. Until they do they are not a prevailing
party and are not entitled to attorney fees at the district court level or on appeal. Union
Warehouse and Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660, 669, 917 P.2d 1300,
1309 (1996) (failure to present evidence establishing insurer failed to pay specific amount justly
due precluded award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 41-1839). Harmons' request for fees
on appeal should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION
State Farm Mutual respectfully requests that the district court's grant of summary
judgment and dismissal of Harmons' Complaint be affirmed.
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APPE~TIIX A

· (2) you, or any person you choo~e, to·
travel· to- retrieve the vehicle and· drive
· . it to .ei th~r .the original destination or
yoiir home: if the vehicle was. left be. hind.. for
repairs.
. .
:·
..
These expenses mi.1st be reported to us before we w{II
such. incurred eipenses.

pjy

.. :·
0.

Rental C~r·; R~pay~ent of Dedu~tible
Expense ·
· We will pay the comprellensive coverage
q.eductible ·or collision coverage .deductible
an insured is required to pay the owner of
a car rented from a cat business.

. · h'ii.ve resulted if we· .had moved the damaged
coveted vehicle; and: '

3.

cJe_a'n'i.lp debris from the c¢ve_red vehicle at the
_tocation of the loss: t~e ind~t }Ve will pay to
clean up the
debris is $250 for any
one loss .
.
.
~

Limits and Loss. Settlement ·-' Comprehensive
Coyerage and Collision Coverage

I: ·We have the right to choose to settle with you
.. : oMlie owner of the covei·ea vehicle in one of
the following ways: · ' ·

S_upp_i_eme~_f~·ry ·.raym~nts .'-: .. Coin'p~eh,ensive
Coverag~ ·and .<:oIUs_ion .Cov~ra_ge ,, . . · ·:· ., ·

a.

Pay the (?Ost torepair the covered vehicle
min.us. any applicable deductible.
.

following tci determine. the cost to repair the covered vehicle: ·
(a) The cost agreed to by both the
owner of the covered vehicle and
us;·
....
(b) -A bid 'or.repair-estimate approved
byus; or··· ··
··
(c) . A-repair estimate that is written
based upon or adjusted to:
(i) .the preva:ilipg competitive
price;
·
·

If th~ covered. J!.ehic/~ sustai11s !9ss for wh_ich we
ma{(e a paymeIJ,t.under Comp,r~hensive Coverage or
Collision Coverage, then }Ve. will- pay reasonable
expep.~es incurred to:
·

l.

tow the cqyered ve~iicle irr;un~diately after the loss:
a.

for a reasonable disfanc·e from the location of
the loss .to .. any .one repair facility chosen by
an insuiwl or: the. owner of the covered vehicle, if the covered vehicle is not drivable; or

b. . to any one repair facility or commercial
storage facility, neither of which was chosen by an insured or the owner of the covered vehicle. We will-also pay reasonable
expenses inctmed to t9w the coyerr2d vehicle for a reasonable distance fron{ this facil·ity to any one repair- facility chosen· by an
insured or the owner ·of the covei·ed vehicle, if the covered vehicle is not drivable;
2. · sto~e·· the: cove~ed ·vehicle,: if it is riot 'drivabl~
. iri:unediately after the loss? at:
a.

b..

(ii) the paintless dent ·repair price
· that is competitive:. in the
1:iarket; or .
.
{iii) a combination of (i) ~nd (ii)
. .,
.
above.
The prevailing coi11petitive price
means prices charged by a majority of the ·repair market in the
area where the covered vehicle is
. to be repaired as determined by a
· su1vey made by us. lf asked, we
will identify some facilities that
v.:ill p(?rfonn the . ~ep~irs. at the
preva1lmg competitive pnce. The
estimate will include parts sufficient to restore the covered vehicle to its pre-lo~s conditioni
· Yo.u agree with, us. -that tl1e repair estimate .may include new, used, recycled,
and reconditioned parts. Any .of .these
parts may be either ori-ginal equipment
manufacturer parts . or non-original
equip,nenf manufacturer parts:
Thu afoo. agree that reP.la,~~~n.ent ilass
need not.· b.ave any l11s1g~11a, iogo,

any orie repair facility or commercial storage facility, neither of whi_ch was ~hosen
by an insured or the owner of the covere.d

·vehicle; and
..

·

.

·we have the right to choose one of the

(1)

.

~:p.y_one repair facility ~hosen by the owner
of.the covered vehicle, and we. detennine
such vehicle is a total loss.

If the owner of the covered vehicle chnsents,
then we may move the· covered vehicle at our
expense to redu.ce storage costs. . If the. owner
of the covered vehicle .do'es .. not consent, then
we· will pay only· the storage ·;cdst~ :that would
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trademark, etching, or other marking
that was on the.replaced glass.v· ...
(2) The c9st to repair the cove,;ed.vehicl{}
does not include any reduction in the
value of the covered vehicle after it
has been repaired, as compared to its
.value before it was damaged.
(3) If the repai~ 'ot "replacement of a pirt
results in l:)etterme.nt of .that pa1t, then
you or the owner qf the coveredyehicle must pay for the amo~n.1t .of the
betterment.
· ·

(4) If you arid. we agr~e,. then windshield
glass will be repaired instead ofreplaced;
b. Pay ~he actual cash value of the covered
vehicle minus any applicable deductible.
Tpe damaged covered vehicle must be
given to us in exchange for our payment,
unless we agree that the owner may keep it.
. If the o:wner keep~ the covered vehicle, then
our payment will be reduced by the value
of the co_ver~d veh~cle _after th~ loss; or
c. Return the stolen covered vehicle to its
.owner ~nd pay, as described in l .a. above,
for ariy direct, s\.1dden, and accidental
damag~ that resulted from the theft.
If the ow~er of the. co'v~red vehicle or you fail
to agree with us on the cost to repair the covered v~hicle or the actual cash value of the
covered vehicle, it shall be decided by an appraisal upon written demand by the owner of
the r:ov~red vehicle, you, or us. Within 10
days of. the ""'.ritteJ1 demand, each party shall
notify the ,other of. the c01ppetent appraiser
each has selected. . The two appraisers shall
_pron:iptly . select. a comretent and impartial
umpire. Not later. than 5 days after the umpire hgs been selected, unless the time period
has been extended by the µmpire, each appraiser shall separately state -.in writing the amount
of the -loss. If the appraisers submit a wdtten
report of agreemeo.t on the."amount of the repair
the co.vereil vehicle or the actual cash value of the cavered vehicle, the agreed amount shall be
binding upon the owner of the covered vehicle,
you, and us. If the appraisers fail to agree, the
appraisers shall promptly submit their differences to the umpire. A ·decis.ion agreed to by
one of the appraisers .and the \1mp1ie .shall be
bindjng 1.ipon the owner of the covered vehicle, you, and us. Air expenses ·and fees, not
including attorney or adJt\ster fees, incurred
because of the appraisal shall be paid as determined by the umpire. The owner of the covered

vehicle, you, and we <;lo not waive any of our
rig[1ts py any act relati.ng: t.o appraisal.
Appraisers. shall have no authority to decide
any other questions of. fact, decide any questions of law, or conduc:t. ~ppraisal on a classwide or class-representative basis ..
2. The .ni.o~t we will pay fof· transportation expenses
und.er Comprehensive <;X>yerage is $25 per day
subJectto·an aggregateJnmt of$750·per loss; .
3. The most we will pay for loss to a njn-owned
trailer or a nQn-.owr,.ed camper is $2,500.
Limits:..... Car Rental and Travel Expenses Coverage
i. ·Car Ren~ai E~pens~
.. Th~ Hinit for Car Reii.tal Expense ··is. shown on.
the Declarations. Page tmder ''J.;iinit'. :-::. Car
Rental Expense - Each Day; Eacli"Loss".

-a:-

Tli.e ·limit" shown l\11der "Each- Day" is "the
.•. inost 1ve wilJ. ·"pay' f01;. the :4aily nh"tal

charge. If:
(1) a dollar amount is shown, then ive wili
· : · pay the daily" rental charge-·up fo that
doll,ar ~mount; _qr,
(2) a percentage amount is shown, then we
will pay that. percentage of the daily

rental: charge. ·. ·
b.

Subject to· the "Each Day" limit; the limit
shown under "Each Loss" is the most we
will pay for Car Rental.Expense incurred
as a result of any one loss: ·. · ·:

2: Trayer txpenses, · ·
•

3.

.,

•

I

• •

•'

•

.
•

•

•

The most we will .pay for Travel Ex}:lenses incurr~d by all in_sureds as. a rei;ult. of any one
loss 1s $500, .
. .. .
·
Rent~l Car, Repaym~nt of Dedt!.cti_l_>le Expense
The n1ost we
pay for Rental:.Car .- Repayment of Deductible Expense incurred as a result of any one loss is $500. .
··
·

will

Nim.duplication: :
We will not ·pay for any loss or expense under the
Physical Damage Coverages for which the ins~red
or" owner of the -covered vehicle has already received
payment from, or on behalf of, a party who is legally
liable for the loss or expense.

Exclusio.ns

;.·

..

THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR: · ·
1.... ,. ANY COVERED. VEHICLE THAT IS:
.··,·a.
.
b.

INTENTIONALLYDAMAGED;°OR
.... ..
,'

\

',

STOLEN

26

9802A
.
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